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US national with contacts among military and political personnel of the Bonn Government, Germany. The above grading was ascribed by the US national who obtained the following intelligence information from a German acquaintance described as a trusted friend of General Adolf Heusinger, a military adviser to Chancellor Adenauer.

1. General Adolf Heusinger thinks that a military offensive by the USSR has become unlikely even though defense plans of the western world have not made the progress expected. He bases this opinion on the conception that the USSR will have to attack everywhere if it attacks anywhere. In other words, although the Soviets could mount successful attacks simultaneously against one or two strategic points, he thinks they are unable to make all the attacks necessary to secure the Soviet defense perimeter.
2. In General Heusinger's opinion, this perimeter reaches from the Persian Gulf to the Suez Canal, from Greece and the Dardanelles along the entire north shore of the Mediterranean to Gibraltar, and the entire Atlantic coast line up to Scandinavia and the Arctic region. In his opinion, the Soviets have to hold all this area from the very beginning in order to make US counterattacks difficult. Should the Soviets attack on only one or two fronts, they would invite US counterattacks on other fronts without making them in any way difficult, let alone impossible.
3. The General put it this way: The Soviets know that every attack now means total reprisal and they cannot invite reprisals without at the same time making them extremely difficult and costly. A thrust in the area between the Alps and the northern shore of Germany, which would be easiest, is considered unlikely in view of the over-extended Soviet left flank which, since Tito's defection, reaches from Turkey to Italy at present. He says that experience on the Eastern front of Germany during World War II showed that Soviet troops never attacked in a similar situation and never before they had massed considerable superiority on all possible fronts, since a slow maneuvering army with difficult communication problems is particularly sensitive to danger which an over-extended flank presents.
4. General Heusinger is of the opinion that at the present moment the Soviets could not be stopped anywhere in Europe, except perhaps at the Pyrenees, but conditions could be created that could make such an attack very risky in the near future. For this purpose, he considers it necessary to break entirely with the classical conception of a contiguous defense line, and states that the Allies should concentrate on the defense of three pivotal areas: the Dardanelles, which is the most important of all; the North Italian (Tagliamento) front backed by an Alpine redoubt which might even include the northern approaches to the Alps south of the Danube River; the third one should comprise southern Scandinavia, Denmark and

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Schleswig. If these three redoubts could be successfully defended, a Soviet onslaught in between these areas could not become disastrous, since counter-attacks could always be launched in back of the attacking Soviet armies.

5. Heusinger stressed that this conception presupposed that the US Air Force was strong enough to cut off most of the Soviet supply lines, which he thinks should not be too difficult, since the attacking Soviet armies would have to rely on six railroads all running through Poland, and five of them over the Vistula River.

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